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The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union between Political
Symbolism
and Legal Realism'
THOMAS VON DANWITZ*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The idea to adopt a Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter) for
the European Union (EU) is a long standing demand raised over and
over again since the early nineteen seventies by national constitutional
courts, governments and community institutions, most notably the
European Parliament and many European law scholars'. But the fate
' Extended version of a lecture held at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on Oct.
12, 2000. The lecture is based on the Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, Convent 47, Charte 4470/00, Sept. 14, 2000. This article is based on the
final version of the Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Convent
50, Charte 4487/00, Sept. 28, 2000; see also Official Journal C 364/2000, 18/12/2000, p. 122.
* Prof. Dr. Thomas von Danwitz, D.I.A.P. (ENA, Paris) holds the Chair for Public and
European Law at Ruhr-University of Bochum. In the Fall semester 2000 he was a
Visiting Professor to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and taught a course in
European Union Law.
1. Gunter Hirsch, EG: Kein Staat, aber eine Verfassung?, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFr (NJW) 46, 47 (2000); Udo Di Fabio, Eine europaische Charta, JURISTEN
ZEITUNG (JZ) 737, 740 (2000); Klaus Ritgen, Grundrechtsschutz in der Europdischen
Union, ZEmTSCHRIFr FOR RECHTSPOLITIK (ZRP) 371, 373 (2000); Ingolf Pernice, Eine
Grundrechte-Chartafar die Europaische Union, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT (DVBL)

847, 848-851 (2000); Susanne Baer, Grundrechtechartaante portas, ZRP 361, 362-363
(2000); Albrecht Weber, Die Europdische Grundrechtscharta- auf dem Weg zu einer
europdischen Verfassung, NJW 537, 538, 542 (2000); Gerald Hdfner, Christoph Strawe &

Robert Zuegg, In der Auseinandersetzung um eine Charta der Grundrechte der
Europdischen Union, ZRP 365

(2000);

Norbert

Reich, Zur Notwendigkeit einer

Europdischen Grundrechtsbeschwerde, ZRP 375 (2000); Josef F. Lindner, EGGrundrechtschartaund gemeinschaftsrechtlicherKompetenzuorbehalt, DIE OFFENTLICHE
VERWALTUNG (DOV) 543, 545 (2000); Erhard Denninger, Anmerkungen zur Diskussion
um Europdische Grundrechte, KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFr FOR GESETZGEBUNG
UND REHCHTSWISSENSCHAFr (KRTTV) 145 (2000); Karl A. Schachtschneider, Ein Oktroi,

nicht die gemeinsame Erkenntnis freier Menschen von ihrem Recht, 206 FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FAZ), Sept.5, 2000, at 9; Peter J. Tettinger, Mehr als eine fleiflige
Sammiung zum Schutz vor Eurokraten?,198 FAZ, Aug. 26, 2000, at 6; Albrecht Weber,

Eine einmalige Chance fir eine europaische Verfassungsgebung, 198 FAZ, Aug. 26, 2000,
at 6; Christian Tomuschat, Manche Rechte bediirfen der Konkretisierung, 181 FAZ, Aug.
7, 2000, at 13; Karl Schwimmer, Einheit - auch in den Menschenrechten, 62 FAZ, Mar. 14,
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of the failed projects striving for a European Constitution issued by the
European Parliament in 1984,2 19893 and 1994", each including a
significant Human Rights chapter,5 might already hint at the
considerable difficulties that the elaboration of a Charter of
Fundamental Rights will face. However at the same time it explains the
important symbolism inherent in this project.
It is indeed a breathtaking endeavor in which the EU engaged itself
following the decision of the Cologne summit in June 1999.6 The EU
called for a Convention charged with the elaboration of a Fundamental
Rights Charter to be solemnly proclaimed by the Nice summit at the
end of 1999 and eventually given full legal force thereafter by inclusion
in the treaties.7 Significant difficulties will have to be overcome to find
a consensus on the role fundamental rights should play as
constitutional limitations to legislative and executive powers, on their
inherent balance between individual and general interests and on their
judicial protection. In this respect, the legal traditions of the member
states of the EU differ considerably. In the constitutional order of the
United Kingdom, the sovereignty of Parliament is still going strong as
we have quite recently been able to witness by the way the Human
Rights of the European Convention of Fundamental Rights and Basic
Freedoms have been incorporated into British law 8 In direct opposition
to the British tradition, Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain have fully
embraced the concept of Constitutional jurisdiction 9 and have
established Constitutional Courts as intermediate bodies between the

2000, at 12; Herta Ddubler-Gmelin, Vorn Marktbirgerzum EU-Barger, 7 FAZ, Jan. 10,
2000, at 11; Herta Daubler-Gmelin, Eine europdische Chartader Grundrechte - Beitrag
zur gemeinsamen Identitdt, EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTscHAFTSRECHT (EuZW) 1
(2000); Bernhard Losch & Wiltrud C. Radau, Grundrechtskatalogfur die Europdische
Union, ZRP 84, 85 (2000).
2. See JORGEN SCHWARZ AND ROLAND BIEBER, EiNE VERFASSUNG FOR EUROPA, 317
ff. (1984) [hereinafter Parliament Resolution 11.
3. Parliament Resolution Adopting the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms, 1989 O.J. (C 120) 51 [hereinafter Parliament Resolution 2].
4. Parliament Resolution on the Constitution of the European Union, 1994 O.J. (C
61) 155 [hereinafter Parliament Resolution 3].
5. See Parliament Resolution 1 supra note 2; Parliament Resolution 2 supra note 3;
Parliament Resolution 3 supra note 4.
6. European Council Conclusion of June 4, 1999, EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT (EuGRZ), 364 (1999); see also European Council Conclusion of Oct. 15, 1999,
available at http'//europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm.
7. European Council Conclusion of June 4, 1999 supra note 6, at 364.
8. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §4 (2)(4)(6), §10 (2), §19 (Eng.).
9. Ernst Benda, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeitin der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
in VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN WESTEUROPA 124-5 (Christian Starck & Albrecht
Weber eds., 1986) [hereinafter VGBK IN WE]; Karl Korinek, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit
in Osterreich, in VGBK IN WE 155-9; Theo Ritterspach, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeitin
Italien, in VGBK IN WE 225-7; Francisco R. Llorente, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeitin
Spanien, in VGBK IN WE 251-4.
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legislative branch of government and the people in the way it has
already been designed in Alexander Hamilton's Federalist papers." But
this concept is far from meeting consensus on the European continent.
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands do not operate a system of
constitutional jurisdiction" and even under the French concept of
preventive constitutional control, statutory laws are still largely
conceived as volont6 gdnbral, an expression which has become famous
after Rousseau.2 Therefore the Conseil constitutionnel is generally
tempted to a significant extent to uphold parliamentary statutes
against Fundamental Right claims.'3
The difficulties of finding a common language on the adequate
degree of fundamental rights protection against statutory law-making
in Europe can nicely be illustrated by referring to a joke about our
practical experience with the linguistic difficulties occurring in the
melting pot of European legal traditions, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ). One advantage of the multi-lingual character of proceedings
before the ECJ is that it sometimes provides moments of light relief.
Visitors to the Court always enjoy watching the gesticulations of the
interpreters. Something that causes interpreters particular difficulty is
jokes, since these often only make sense in the language in which they
are told. One quick-witted interpreter got round this problem by saying
"Counsel is in the process of telling a joke. It is completely impossible to
translate. However, I think it would be polite to laugh.., now!" The
judges dutifully chuckled at the appropriate moment and Counsel could
be seen preening himself on his wit.14

II. CAUSES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT
In the diplomatic language of the Cologne summit" the Charter is
designed to express the overall importance of fundamental rights for
the EU's citizens by rendering them more visible in the solemnly

10. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 229 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
11. Author's opinion.
12. JEAN-JACQUES ROuSSEAu, Du CONTRAT SoCIAL 69 (Frangois Bouchardy ed.,
Egloff Paris 1946) (1762).

13. Cons. const. 83-162 of July 20, 1983, J.O., July 22, 1983, p. 2267; AL.D., p. 63;
Cons. const. 86-207 of June 26, 1986, J.O., June 27, 1986, p. 7978; A-L.D., p. 71; Cons.
const. 98401 of June 10, 1998, J.O., June 14, 1998, p. 9036; A.L.D., p. 258 ; Marie-Pauline
Deswarte, L'intdrft gdndral dans la jurisprudence du Conseil Constitutionnel, REVUE
FRANCAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (R.F.D.C.) 23, 36 (1993); Laurent Habib, La notion
d'erreurmanifeste d'apprdciationdans la jurisprudencedu Conseil Constitutionnel, RDP
695, 709 (1986).
14. This wit is purely fictional and not attributable to a particular incident at the

ECJ.
15. See Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pmbl. para. 4;
see also Daubler-Gmelin, Vom Marktbirgerzum EU.Bilrger, supra note 1 at 11.
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declared Charter.' Starting off from this basis it has been argued that
a Charter of Fundamental Rights will enhance the citizen's
identification with the EU and will therefore - similar to the idea of
constitutional patriotism - form the nucleus for a future European
identity. 17 Without denouncing the value of a written Human Rights
Charter for the citizen's consciousness, let me express my reserves on
this point. Technically we don't need a constitutional Charter for the
EU - the treaties serve this purpose perfectly well."6 The nature of the
treaties as a constitutional statute has already been recognized by the
European Court of Justice some fifteen years ago19 and has not been
called into question ever since. Nonetheless there is an ongoing debate
about the making of a European Constitution these days." It is easy to
understand the political appeal inherent in that symbolism, but it is
difficult to grasp the substantial change of European constitution
building in a strictly legal sense. There is of course the long-standing
demand for a clear-cut catalogue of respective competences and their
division between the European institutions and the member states."
But this undertaking can easily be realized within the existing frame of
the treaties and does not require their re-labeling as a European
constitution.
Given the fact that a definite transfer of ultimate
sovereignty of the member states to the EU" is politically excluded for
the foreseeable future," a European constitution could in any case only
be considered a complementary constitutional order concluded amongst
the member states in order to assure a joint exercise of sovereignty
rights. In that respect again there is little difference to the current
situation, in which member states have agreed to form an ever-closer
union without setting a time limit." Under both constructions the
member states keep the theoretical option to leave the EU while
practically continuing to create a common political identity that makes
it realistically impossible to terminate membership unilaterally. Aside
from the semantic appeal of this project, legally there seems to be little
new in the idea of a European constitution. Politically we don't need all

16. Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 15.
17. Weber, Eine einmalige Chance fair eine europdische Verfassungsgebung, supra
note 1 at 6; see also Weber, Die Europdische Grundrechtscharta- auf dem Weg zu einer
europaischen Verfassung, supra note 1 at 537.
18. Jean-Claude Piris, L'Union europdenne a-t-elle une constitution? Lui en faut-il
une? 35 (4) RTDE 599-635 (1999).
19. See Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365; see also
Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, 6102, para. 21.
20. See di Fabio, supra note 1, at 740, 743; see also Piris, supra note 18, at 599-635.
21. THOMAS VON DANwITz, VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHES SYSTEM UND EUROPAISCHE
INTEGRATION 427 (1996).

22. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech in Warsaw (Oct. 6, 2000); see also
French President Jacques Chirac, Speech in the German Bundestag (June 27, 2000).
23. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, pmbl., 1997 O.J. (C340) 145, available at
http://europa.eu.int.
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the difficulties that would undoubtedly occur in the course of a
realization or even of a possible failure of such a project. Finally, I
think the fascination for fundamental rights protection should not lead
us to an unrealistic assessment of the impact that such a Charter would
have on the hearts and minds of the average European citizen. We
should praise ourselves lucky if a significant portion of the population
will be aware of its existence once it has been adopted.
In legal reality the principal reason for elaborating a Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU is the widespread concern, if not
skepticism, of whether the level of human rights protection assured by
the ECJ is really meeting the importance attached to them on the
national level and the legitimate expectations of the citizensof the EU.
In spite of the lacking textual basis in the original treaties, the ECJ has
- after overcoming some early reserves2' - devoted much of its
jurisprudence to recognize and develop fundamental rights.' The ECJ
certainly deserves credit for this judge made protection of fundamental
rights, even when we have to bear in mind that its motivation was
certainly not exclusively the desire to protect human rights for their
own sake. A second motivation for the ECJ certainly was the need for
European fundamental rights protection in order to ensure the
supremacy of European law over national constitutional law, which was
challenged by fundamental rights claims put forward against European
legislation. 8
Despite a rich fundamental rights' jurisprudence of the ECJ, the
level of protection has always remained a principal reason for doubtful
assessments by fundamental rights scholars, particularly from Italy
and Germany. 27 For the academic community, particularly in these
24. See e.g. Case 1/58, Stork v. High Authority, 1959 E.C.R. 17, 26-7; Joined Cases 36,
37, 38 & 40/59, Geitling v. High Authority, 1960 E.C.R. 423.
25. See e.g. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419; Case 11/70,
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle, 1970 E.C.R. 1125; Case
4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491; Case 44t79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz,
1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3745; Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 E.C.R.
2609; see also ELLEN CHWOLIK-LANFERMANN,
GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ IN DER
EUROPAISCHEN UNION, 47 (1994).
26. Compare Jason Coppel & Aidan O'Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking
Rights Seriously?, 29 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW (CMLREV) 669, 682 (1992), with
Joseph H. H. Weiler & Nicolas J.S. Lockhart, 'Taking Rights Seriously" Seriously: The
European Court and its FundamentalRights Jurisprudence,32 CMLREV 51, 52-3 (1995).
27. Antonio La Pergola and Patrick Del Duca, New InternationalLaw in National
Systems: Community Law and the Italian Constitution, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 609 (1985);
Giovanni Pau, Il diritto della Comunitd economica europea nell'ordinamento italiano, 67
Riv. DIR. INT. 512 (1987); Adelina Adinolfi, The JudicialApplication of Community Law in
Italy
(1981-1997),
35
CMLREV
1313,
1323
(1998);
RUDOLF
STREINZ,
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTLICHER
GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ
UND
EUROPAISCHES
GEMEINSCHAFTSRECET 309 (1989); HANS-WERNER RENGELING, GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ IN
DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 209 (1992); Albert Bleckmann, Die Rechtsquellen des
Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT (NVwZ)
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countries used to strict human rights scrutiny, it remains a striking
statistical fact that fundamental rights claims against EU legislation
concerning property and professional liberty have not been successful
over the past 30 years in one single case before the ECJ.' Compared to
the high number of verdicts from national constitutional courts over
national legislation regulating property rights and professional liberty,
this practice raised doubts over the effectiveness of judicial review
exercised by the ECJ.' At the same time it has to be acknowledged
that the ECJ apparently tends to favor other legal grounds than
fundamental rights for review of European legislation." Therefore, in
the end it appears unjustified to criticize the court for a complete lack of
fundamental rights protection in such decisive fields as professional
liberties and property rights, but it explains at the same time the wellfounded skepticism on the level of fundamental rights protection
exercised by the ECJ. In both countries the constitutional courts have
explicitly reserved themselves the right to exercise a final review, but
only under the condition that the constitutionally prescribed level of
fundamental rights protection for their national citizens would
generally not be attained by the ECJ.3'
Since the respective
constitutions do not contain any provision on the required level of
protection, it' becomes quite apparent that a written Fundamental
Rights Charter can do little about the level of protection that is
practically ensured by any jurisdiction. But there is a real influence the
Fundamental Rights Charter can exercise. By convincing the ECJ of
the overall importance of the protection of fundamental rights it can
lead the ECJ to accept that this is the principal mission it has to
824, 827 (1993); Martin Nettesheim, GrundrechtlichePriufdichtedurch den EuGH, EUZW
106, 107 (1995); Ulrich Everling, Will Europe slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgement
of the Court of Justice and National Courts, 33 CMLREV 401, 413 (1996); Torsten Stein,
Bananen-Split? Entzweien sich BVerfG und EuGH uber den Bananenstreit?,EUZW 261
(1998); Ritgen, supra note 1 at 372; Gerald G. Sander, Europdischer Gerichtshof und
nationale Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit,DOV 588, 589-592 (2000).
28. See Thorsten Kingreen, art. 6 EUV, in KOMMENTAR DES VERTRAGES OBER DIE
EUROPIASCHE UNION UND DES VERTRAGES ZUR GROYNDUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN
GEMEINScHAFT 78 (Christian Calliess & Matthias Ruffert eds., 1999); Ritgen, supra note
1 at 372.
29. See Nettesheim, supra note 27, at 106; see also Everling, supra note 27, at 401,
413; Stein, supra note 27, at 261, 262; Stefan Storr, Zur Bonitat des Grundrechtsschutzes
in der Europdischen Union, 36 DER STAAT 547, 552 (1997).
30. It should not be concealed that the European Court of Justice stated a breach of
the protection of confidence which is - whereas independently guaranteed by European
Community law - tied with the property right in German Constitutional law. See e.g.
Case 170/86, Deetzen v. Hauptzollant Hamburg-Jonas, 1988 E.C.R. 2368, 2373; Theodor
Schilling, Eigentum und Marktordnung nach Gemeinschafts- und nach deutschem Recht,
EuGRZ 177, 184 (1998); Ritgen, supra note 1, at 372; Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of
Germany v. Parliament, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419, para. 50.
31. See BVerfGE 73 339 (Solange II), 387; see also BverfGE 89 155 (Maastricht), 175;
Corte cost., Dec. 27, 1973, EUR 1974, 255, 261; Riv. dir. internaz. [1989], p. 104; Riv. it.
dir. pubbl. com. [19961, p. 764.
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accomplish." Hopefully this will indirectly lead to an enhanced level of
fundamental rights protection in the EU.n
It is particularly important to convince the ECJ that fundamental
rights need to be protected in a more efficient way in the future, since
the ECJ denied the European Communities' power to enter into the
system of human rights protection established by the European
Convention of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms some years ago."
Thereby it left the political institutions of the European Communities
without a legal option for an enhanced protection of fundamental rights.
Interestingly enough the central motivation for the ECJ's reluctance to
enter into the protection offered by the system of the Convention was
the Court's desire to safeguard its jurisdictional autonomy towards the
European Court of Human Rights. 35 This attitude is not without
delicacy since the ECJ is required to surrender a lot of this procedural
autonomy and to fully participate in the system of preliminary ruling
proceedings established by article 234 ECT from the national
constitutional courts. 6

III. THE CONTENTS OF THE PROPOSED CHARTER
A close look at the Charter as it has been drafted by the Convention
reveals an impressive compilation of fundamental rights already
recognized in a variety of national constitutions and international
human rights charters.37 Given the multitude of inspiring sources for
the Charter it is remarkable to see the slim product of the Convention's
deliberations: 54 short cut articles are considered sufficient legislative
out-put to accomplish the Charter's mission. In that respect the Charter
sticks to the conventional wisdom of continental tradition that

32. In order to promote this objective, additional modifications of the Court's
procedural law might appear helpful. For example, the Advocate general could be
required to give a comparative overview over the level of protection in all Member states.
Furthermore an additional Advocate general exclusively treating cases of significant
importance to Fundamental Rights might give this new mission an institutional backing.
33. See Ritgen, supra note 1, at 372.
34. See Giorgio Gaja, Annotation: Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Given on 28 March 1996, Not Yet Reported, 33 CMLREV 973, 983 (1996) (discussing ECJ
Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.C.R. 1-1759 at 1789, para. 36) and
PATRICK WACHSMANN, LEs DROITS DE L'HOMME 175 (3d ed. 1997).

35. See Giorgio Gaja, Id.
36. See Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, Der EuGH und die Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten
- Komponenten der richterlichen Gewalt in der Europiiischen Union, 27 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1889 (2000).

37. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1,
8, Preamble, para. 5, http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf [hereinafter
Charter].
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constitutions have to be short and obscure, as already Abbg Siey~s3 has
put it. This rule was of course established to ensure the utmost
flexibility for the political institutions acting under a constitution. 9 In
the EU's system of constitutional jurisdiction, it is certain that the ECJ
is perfectly aware of how to take advantage of this drafting technique.
It matches perfectly well with the flexibility seeking judicial strategy, in
which the ECJ's judgments are essentially phrased."'
1.

Contents and Particularitiesof the Charter

In general, the granted rights do not contain much of a surprise.
The Charter is based upon the traditional concept of fundamental
rights as a tool to protect citizens against public authority
interventions. The Charter is divided into seven chapters on dignity,
freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizenship, justice and general
provisions.4 1 After starting out with fundamental values such as human
dignity,42 the right to life3 and personal integrity" in the first chapter,
the chapter on freedoms contains the rights to liberty and security,45 the
freedom of thought, conscience, religion, 6 expression and information.'
The economic freedoms to choose an occupation,4 to conduct business49
and the right to education ° and property"' are also laid down in this
chapter. This chapter of the Charter contains also guarantees for the
respect of private life,52 the protection of personal data3 and against
removal, expulsion and extradition."
In contrast to this general
38. See EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYAS, POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN 1788-1790 166, n.28
(Eberhard Schmitt & Rolf Reichardt trans. & eds.) (1975). The claim for "obscurity" is
ascribed to tradition, compare Jacques Godechot, L'histoire constitutionnelle de la France
de 1789 eknos jours, 38 JOR N.F. 45, 54 (1989), and even doubted by THOMAS HAFEN VON
WrrENBACH, STAAT, GESELLSCHAFr UND BURGER IM DENKEN VON EMMANUEL JOSEPH

SIEYES 102 n.51 (1994).
39. THOMAS HAFEN VON WITTENBACH, Id.
VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHES
SYSTEM UND
40. See THOMAS
VON DANWITZ,
EUROPAISCHE INTEGRATION 150 et seq. (1996) (providing details of the imperatoria

brevitas of the Court's judgments and a critical assessment).
41. Ch. I: arts. 1-5, ch. II: arts. 6-19, ch. III: arts. 20-26, ch. IV: arts. 27-38, ch. V: arts.
39-46, ch. VI: arts. 47-50, ch. VII: arts. 51-54. Charter, supra note 37, at 9 et seq.
42. Id. at 9, art. 1.
43. Id. at 9, art. 2.
44. Id. at 9, art. 3.
45. Id. at 10, art. 6.
46. Id. at 10, art. 10.
47. Id. at 11, art. 11.
48 Id. at 11, art. 15.
49. Id. at 12, art. 16.
50. Id. at 11, art. 14.
51. Id. at 12, art. 17.
52. Id. at 10, art. 7.
53. Id. at 10, art. 8.
54. Id. at 12, art. 19.
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approach of the Charter some far-reaching rights are granted in chapter
IV on "solidarity".5 5 They include not only the right to collective
bargaining and action" and legal protection against unfair dismissal,57
but also the right to reconcile family and professional life' and the
access to services of general economic interest.55
With the latter
guarantee, the Charter joins the French concept of the constitutional
value of the so-called service public.6 A most recent development is
reflected in the principles set out with respect to the fields of medicine
and biology, such as the prohibition of any reproductive cloning of
human beings. 6' Finally, the individually granted right to an effective
remedy before a court is worth noting. In article 47 paragraph 1 of the
Charter, the concept to protect individual rights by independent courts
clearly prevails over the idea to objectively ensure the rule of law by
forms of inner-administrative control, as they subsist 2in British and,
though to a lesser extend, in French administrative law.6
In comparison to the richness of values embodied in the human
rights chapters of national constitutions, the Charter has too few, too
indefinite and too neutral notions to offer.'
This is certainly not a
weakness of the Charter itself, but it reflects directly the unique nature
of the EU as a compound of national states with a great variety of
distinct societies, each of them representing a quite different set of
values. The mutual respect for their diversity in culture, tradition and
identity, as it is underlined in paragraph 3 of the Charter's preamble,"
requires a somewhat minimalist understanding of common European

55. Art. 27 (Workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking),
art. 28 (Right of collective bargaining and action), art. 29 (Right of access to placement
services), art. 30 (Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal), art. 31 (Fair and just
working conditions), art. 32 (Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at
work), art. 33 (Family and professional life), art. 34 (Social security and social assistance),
art. 35 (Health care), art. 36 (Access to services of general economic interest), art. 37
(Environmental protection), art. 38 (Consumer protection). See id. at 15-17.
56. Id. at 15, art. 28.
57. Id. at 15, art. 30.
58. Id. at 16, art. 33.
59. Id. at 17, art. 36.
60. For details see Patrick Delvolv6, Service public et libertes publiques, R.F.D.A., 1
(1985); Louis Favoreu, Service public et Constitution,A.J., June 1997 at 16, note special.
61. See Charter, supra note 37 at 9, art. 3, para. 3.
62. For the different concepts in German and French administrative law and their
respective influence on EC-law, see Thomas von Danwitz, Zur Grundlegungeiner Theorie
der subjektiv-offentlichen Gemeinschaftsrechte, DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 481
(1996); Jean-Marie Woehrling, Die franzosische Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeitim Vergleich
mit der deutschen, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 21, 23, 25 (1985); JeanMarie Woehrling, Die deutsche und franzosische Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit an der
Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert, NEUE ZEITCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 462, 464
(1998).
63. See Charter, supra note 37 at 8, Preamble.
64. See id. at 8, Preamble, para. 3.
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values embodied in the guaranteed fundamental rights of the Charter,
even at the price of a certain meaninglessness. For sure, this dilemma
directly raises doubts as to whether an entity such as the EU deserves a
Fundamental Rights Charter. Furthermore it hints, once again, at the
questions about the final objective of the European integration process
between uniformity and diversity.
2.

Remaining Problems

Beyond this structural problem of the entire project, the draft
version of the Charter contains quite a number of obvious weaknesses,
contradictions and unanswered questions both of technical and political
nature.
For example, it remains undecided whether only the
institutions of the EU and the member states are subject to the
Charter's guarantees while implementing EU law, as article 51
paragraph 1 suggests,' or whether the Charter will produce horizontal
effects, thus binding private enterprises and citizens, as most of the
social rights of the Charter presuppose.'
a)

The Rule on Limitations of Fundamental Rights

A point of essential importance for the evaluation of the Charter is
the scope of the granted rights. For the practical importance of an
effective fundamental rights protection, it is not so much the statutory
guarantee that matters, but the extend to which limitations of these
fundamental rights, as they are inherent in any kind of legislation, are
constitutionally permitted. Both the democratic principle and the rule
of law require in a long-standing constitutional tradition in
parliamentary systems that such a limitation can only result from a
legislative act passed by parliament.67 Only parliamentary legislation
can provide the required democratic legitimacy for any limitation of

65. See id. at 21, art. 51.
66. Article 51 paragraph 1 provides: "The provisions of this Charter are addressed to
the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity
and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall
therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in
accordance with their respective powers," (see id. at 21, art. 51); Article 32: "The
employment of children is prohibited. The minimum age of admission to employment
may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age, without prejudice to such rules
as may be more favourable to young people and except for limited derogations. Young
people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be
protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health
or physical, mental, moral or social development or to interfere with their education," (see
id. at 16, art. 32); Matthias Mahlmann, Die Grundrechtschartader Europdischen Union,
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EUROPAISCHE STUDIEN, 419 at 438 (2000).
67. See DIMITRIS TRIANTAFYLLoU, VOM VERTRAGS- ZUM GESETZESVORBEHALT 158 et
seq. (1996).
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fundamental rights. Contrary to that tradition, the provision foreseen
in article 52 paragraph 1, only requiring a legal provision by the
competent legislative authority for any kind of fundamental rights
limitation, 69 hardly addresses the problem at all. With this provision
the Charter falsely pretends that any legislative act of EU institutions
could produce sufficient democratic legitimacy to limit fundamental
rights. This is particularly doubtful for the regulating power of the
European Commission under article 86 paragraph 3 ECT.70 Instead of
making an effort to reduce the democratic deficit of the European
Communities, the Charter merely denies its existence.71 Even without
addressing the unsolved question of the democratic insufficiencies of the
European Parliament, it would have been the least to require a
legislative act jointly passed by Council and Parliament according to
the procedure foreseen in article 251 ECT 71 for any limitation of
fundamental rights. But since this would have opened such important
fields as the common agricultural policy and the regulation of public
enterprises to the Parliament's consent, basic requirements of the
democratic principle were, once again, sacrificed on the altar of
European integrationist pragmatism.
b)

The Provision on Proportionality

I have already noted that there is a widespread skepticism among
European law scholars about the level of fundamental rights protection
ensured by the ECJ. It is particularly the way in which the ECJ has
employed the principle of proportionality in conceding a wide margin of
discretion to the law-making institutions that has aroused this

68. For details see 49 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (BVerfGE) 89, 126 et seq. (1978);
53 BVerfGE 30, 56 (1979); 61 BVerfGE 260, 275; 88 BVerfGE 103, 116 (1993).
Concerning Article 34 of the French constitution, "la loi fixe les r~gles concernant les
droits civiques et les garanties fondamentales accord~es aux citoyens pour 1'exercice des
libertds
publiques"
(CONST.
DE
1958
art.
34
(Fr.), httpJ/www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/textes/constit.pdf) see Conseil Constitutionnel, 27.11.1959, R.A.T.P.,
Rec. 67, and Cons. Const. 82-143 DC, July 30, 1982 Blocage des Prix et des Revenus, Rec.
57. The prerequisite is explicitly laid down in the constitution of the Swiss Confederation
set in
force on
Apr. 18,
1999
(CONST.
art. 36,
para.
1
(Switz.),
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/101/a36.html), as well as the Spanish Constitution set in
force on Dec.
29,
1978 (CONST.
ESPANOLA art. 53, para.
1 (Spain),
http://www.valencianet.com/constitucion/consttl.htm).
See supra note 31.
69. See Charter, supra note 37 at 21, art. 52, para 1.
70. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C
340)
3,
art.
86,
para.
3
(1997),
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/treaties/dat/ecsconstreatyen.pdf [hereinafter EC TREATY].
71. Even the requirement foreseen in an earlier draft of the Charter that a limitation
of fundamental rights could not result from a provision issued for mere implementation
purposes, was abandoned.
72. See EC Treaty, supra note 70 at art. 251.
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concern. 73 Though the principle of proportionality is particularly
mentioned in article 52 paragraph 1," this provision does not take the
conventional doctrine into account that limitations of fundamental
rights can only pass the proportionality test, if the legitimate interest
pursued by a statutory act can out-weight the particular importance of
the fundamental right specifically concerned. Therefore we might
continue to see the unspecified and unsubstantiated reference to the
proportionality of statutory law-making by EU institutions, as it has
3
marked the rulings of the ECJ so far."
By supposing that any
legitimate objective pursued by legislation must be genuinely met, this
provision at least gives the ECJ the mandate to verify in its own
competence whether the objectives pursued by EU legislation are
virtually given. 6 This diagnosis shows that the Charter's provision on
proportionality is far from providing satisfactory results, if you consider
a strict application of the proportionality test desirable. To the contrary
it seems that the Charter's provision concedes a wide margin of
discretion to the legislative institutions of the EU. In sum, the
provision on proportionality cannot be considered sufficient to calm the
widespread criticism of the ECJ's current practice.
c)

The Level of Protection

The provisions in article 52 paragraph 37 and article 5378 designed
to ensure an adequate level of fundamental rights protection reflect
73. See Everling supra note 27 at 419; ANGELIKA EMMERIcH-FRITSCHE, DER
GRUNDSATZ DER VERHALTNISMABIGKEIT ALS DIREKTIVE UND SCHRANKE DER EGRECHTSETZIUNG 365 (2000); PETER SELMER, DIE GEWAHRLEISTUNG DER UNABDINGBAREN
GRUNDRECHTSSTANDARDS DURCH DEN EUGH 108 (1998); Nettesheim, supra note 27 at
106.
74. "Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others." Charter, supra note 37 at 21,
art. 52, para. 1.
75. Walter Pauly, Strukturfragen des unionsrechtlichen Grundrechtsschutzes,
EUROPA-RECHT 242, 259 et seq. (1998); Georg M. Berrisch, Zum ,Bananen" - Urteil des
EuGH yom 5.10.1994 - Rs. C-280/93, Deutschland ./. Rat der Europaischen Union,
EUROPA-RECHT 461, 465 et seq. (1994); Nettesheim, supra note 27 at 106 et seq.
76. Author's opinion.
77. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive
protection. Charter, supra note 37 at 21, art. 52, para. 3.
78. Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of
application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to
which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
and by the Member States' constitutions. Id. at 21, art. 53.
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more of an indefinite political symbolism than of a reliable normative
answer to the problem. Article 53 is nothing more than a general
guideline for the ECJ not to stay behind the protection granted by
international law, international agreements signed by the EU or its
member states and their respective constitutions. Since the level of
protection offered under these different declarations is far from being
homogenous, this guideline still leaves it open to the ECJ to choose the
specific level of protection, which it considers adequate for the EU. More
precisely than article 53, article 52 paragraph 3 directly links the
fundamental rights of the EU to the corresponding guarantees of the
European Convention of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms. 9 In view
of the current jurisprudence of the ECJ, this provision should lead to a
significant rise of the fundamental rights protection in the EU that may
not be neglected. 0 Nonetheless it has to be noted that a procedural link
from the ECJ to the European Court of Human Rights is still missing.
Given the identity of substantial standards, as the Charter requires
them, the lack of any procedural link between the two jurisdictions is
particularly regrettable. Therefore a preliminary ruling procedure
designed after art. 234 ECT, as it has already been proposed,81 would be
an adequate way to fully ensure an overall accordance of fundamental
rights protection between both Courts. •
If the standard of the European Convention would generally
become the fundamental rights standard for the EU, this development
would, without any doubt, constitute a significant improvement and
reassurance for the protection of fundamental rights in the European
Union in general. Nonetheless the disparities between the
constitutionally granted rights within the member states and the
protection level of their corresponding rights on the European scale
would still persist. For the foreseeable future there is little hope in
sight that the reserves expressed by the constitutional courts of Italy
and Germany on the protection of fundamental rights by the ECJ will
be lifted. At the bottom line, these differences seem to reflect quite
distinct historical experiences in the 20' century. After national
socialism, war and communism in one part of the country, Germany,
79. Id. at 21, art. 52, para. 3.
80. For different levels of protection. see, e.g., Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst
AG v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859, 2924, para. 17; Niemietz v. Germany, App. No.
13710/88, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, para. 31 (1993); Case 374/87, Orkem SA v. Commission,
1989 E.C.R. 3283, 3350, para. 30; Funke v. France, App. No. 10828/84, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep.
297, para. 44 (1993); Case C-260189, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia v.
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, 2963, para. 41 et seq.; Lentia v. Austria,
App. No. 13914/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 93, para. 39 et seq. (1994); Case C-159190, Society
for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland ltd. v. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, 4741,
para. 28 et seq.; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 53, para. 70 et seq. (1992).
81. See Walter Schwimmer, Einheit - auch in den Menschenrechten, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Mar. 14, 2000, at 12.
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Italy, Spain and Portugal have considered an extended protection of
fundamental rights as a master plan to safeguard their happily
acquired democracy. 2 As Roman Herzog, who presided over the
Convention charged with the elaboration of the Fundamental Rights
Charter, put it while he was still serving as President of the German
Constitutional Court: "I have - despite the impressive jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice on Fundamental Rights - never withheld
that my colleagues of the second Senate appear to me like the evil
parents of Haensel and Gretel, who abandon their innocent children
quite unexpectedly in a forest of restricted protection of fundamental
rights, particularly because the high standard of fundamental rights
protection is not one of the typical German exaggerations, but a lesson
from bitter days."' On the contrary, the historical record of the United
Kingdom and partly of France show that an elaborated system of
judicial protection for individually granted fundamental rights is not
the only possible way to individual freedom and to stable social
conditions for a successful democracy.84
The principal difference
between the two approaches is nothing less fundamental than the
necessity of constitutional jurisdiction. While the British conception
resides on trust in the traditional, but legally unenforceable respect of
fundamental rights by political institutions • as safeguard of
fundamental rights, the mainstream perception on the European
continent favors the need for jurisdictional control as an ultimate
safeguard of an effective human rights protection.85 It seems that the
convincing results achieved by constitutional jurisdictions around the
world seem to mark the way for the future development. With the
steadily growing heritage of common experiences in the collective
memory of the European peoples, these different perceptions will only
step by step be replaced by a joint understanding for an adequate level
of fundamental rights protection.

82. See Konrad Hesse, Bestand und Bedeutung der Grundrechte in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 427, 430 (1978);
KLAUS STERN, DAs STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND III/l § 60 (1988);
JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART 42 et seq. (1951).
83. See
Roman
Herzog,
Verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen
des
Binnenmarktes aus deutscher Sicht, in BITBURGER GESPRACHE JAHRBUCH 1990 1, 2
(Gesellschaft ffir Rechtspolitik Trier ed., 1990).
84. See Dieter Feger, Die Grundrechte in den ibrigen Mitgliedstaaten der EG
einschliefllich der Rechte der Europaischen Menschenrechtskonvention, JURISTISCHE
AUSBILDUNG 6, 8 et seq., 12 et seq. (1987).
85. See Hesse, supra note 85 at 429; Paula Kingston & Colin Imrie, Vereinigtes
Konigreich, in GRUNDRECHTE IN EUROPA UND USA, 715, 787 et seq. (Eberhard Grabitz ed.,
1986).
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THE ROLE OF THE CHARTER IN THE FUTURE COURSE OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION

The most intriguing aspect of the Charter is without any doubt
treated in article 51 paragraph 2.86 According to this provision, the
Charter does not establish any new power or task for the European
Community or the EU and does not modify powers and tasks defined by
the treaties.87 The political message of subsidiarity is quite easy to
catch, but the substantial problem that it is designed to address merits
closer study.
This provision reflects the identical experience of such different
countries as the United States, Canada, Switzerland and Germany that
the installation of a strong fundamental rights jurisdiction on the
federal level will necessarily create uniform legal standards" and
thereby over time bear significant harmonization effects. This is as well
and particularly true for the jurisprudence of the ECJ, using
fundamental rights to review national legislation of the member states
even in fields where the Community has no powers. Quite recently the
ECJ has moreover proceeded the same way89 despite an explicit
limitation of the fundamental right in question to the tasks of the
Communities outlined in article 3 paragraph 2 ECT.' In addition to
this general experience in federal states and to the particular heritage
of the ECJ's jurisprudence, the extent to which the ECJ is able to apply
European fundamental rights in order to review legislation of the
member states is far from being precisely defined. According to the
ECJ's constant jurisprudence, national legislation is up for review, if it
is situated within the frame of the EC law.91 This notion, of course, is
86. "This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the
Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties." Charter, supra note 37 at 21,
art. 51, para. 2.
87. Id.
88. Concerning Canada see Ludwig Weber, Grundrechtsschutz in Kanada Ungeschriebene Grundrechte und die kanadische Bill of Rights, 40 ZErrSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHEs RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 727, 746 (1980), concerning the
United States see William Joseph Wagner, The Role of Basic Values in the Contemporary
Constitutional Hermeneutics of Germany and the United States, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 178, 189 et seq. (1996), and,
though euphemistically pronounced, see Weber, supra note 1.
89. See Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2000 E.C.R. 1-69,
para. 17 [20001; Case C-273/97, Angela Maria Sirdar v. The Army Board, 1999 E.C.R. I7403 at 7440, para. 17 [19991.
90. "In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women." EC TREATY,
supra note 70 at art. 3, para. 2.
91. See Joined Cases 201 & 202/85 Klensch v. Secretaire d'etat h l'Agriculture dt A la
Viticulture, 1986 E.C.R. 3477, 3507, para. 8; Case 5/88 Wachauf v. Bundesamt fir
Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft, 1989 E.C.R. 2609. 2639, para. 19; Case C-260/89, supra
note 83 at 2964, para. 42; Florence Zampini, La Cour de justice des Communautds
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designed to give the ECJ a maximum of flexibility and to avoid any
precision on the field of application for European fundamental rights.
Therefore it seems well suited for further use under the Charter's
applicability rule in article 51 paragraph 1. In the end, we might see
things completely unchanged left to the discretion of the ECJ.
The doubts cast over the sincerity of the subsidiarity approach of
article 51 paragraph 1 and 2 are even multiplied by the simple fact that
it is contradicted by quite a number of specifically granted rights. The
prohibition of death penalty and the principles governing criminal
procedures as well as the right to collective bargaining are undoubtedly
important guarantees. But as long as the EU and the member
Communities have no power in these fields, such guarantees make no
sense under the subsidiarity approach. They seem to be designed for
powers to be acquired by the European Communities in these fields in
the future. But since powers need to be formally transferred to the EU,93
it seems no more than logical to link the grant of the corresponding
fundamental rights to the transfer of new powers. Therefore the
precipitated grant of fundamental rights seems to serve only one
purpose: to provide the frame of EU law that the ECJ requires in order
to exercise judicial review over national legislation in these fields.
V.

CONCLUSION

Summing up all different aspects for a conclusion, the Charter
certainly deserves the solemn declaration foreseen by the heads of state
for the Nice summit, but it is quite clearly not ready to enter into legal
force.' Given the fundamental importance of the legal status of the
Charter, it appears quite evident that the entire project is closely linked
to the elaboration of a precisely defined catalogue of legislative and
executive powers and their division between the European institutions
and the member states. As long as this principal dispute has not been
settled, it would be legally misleading and politically unwise to enforce
harmonization effects by formally adopting a Fundamental Rights
Charter and thereby aggravate the dispute over a suitable competence
structure for the enlarged European Union. 5

europdenes, gardienne des droits fondamentaux ,dans le cadre du droit communautaire",
35 R.T.D.E. 659 (1999).
92. See Charter, supra note 37 at 21, art. 51, para. 1.
93. See id. at 21, art. 51.
94. For this judgment, see Tomuschat, supra note 1.
95. See Hirsch, supra note 1; Tettinger, supra note 1.

